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THE PROCESS THAT IS DUE: 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE  
AS THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR 
UNIVERSITY ADJUDICATIONS OF 
STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL  
ASSAULT COMPLAINTS 
Abstract: In April 2011, the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civ-
il Rights issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” to colleges and universities clar-
ifying their obligation, as a condition of the receipt of federal funding 
under Title IX, to respond promptly and effectively to complaints of stu-
dent-on-student sexual assault. The Letter explained that schools must, 
among other requirements, use the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard of proof in campus disciplinary proceedings for student sexual 
assault complaints. Commentators quickly criticized the use of the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard as violating accused students' due 
process rights. This Note examines the history of the due process rights of 
public school students and applies the Supreme Court’s Mathews v. El-
dridge procedural due process balancing test to demonstrate that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard adequately protects accused stu-
dents’ rights. When the accused students’ individual interests are bal-
anced against a realistic assessment of the risk of erroneous findings and 
the significant competing interests of colleges and universities in the par-
ticular context of student-on-student sexual assault, it becomes clear that 
schools may comply with Title IX without jeopardizing the rights of ac-
cused students. 
Introduction 
 Sexual violence, including rape and other forms of sexual assault, 
is a pervasive problem facing colleges and universities across the United 
States.1 As many as one in every five women is likely to be raped or sex-
ually assaulted during her college years, most often by someone she 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Heather M. Karjane et al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Sexual Assault on Campus: 
What Colleges and Universities Are Doing About It 2 (2005), available at https:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf; Lexie Kuznick & Megan Ryan, Introduction to 
Changing Social Norms? Title IX and Legal Activism: Comments from the Spring 2007 Harvard Jour-
nal of Law & Gender Conference, 31 Harv. J.L. & Gender 367, 374 (2008). 
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knows.2 In fact, women who attend college face a greater risk of being 
raped than other women in the same age group who do not attend col-
lege.3 Additionally, the physical, mental, and emotional consequences 
of rape can be devastating for the victim.4 College-student victims 
struggle to maintain their grades and attendance and are likely to drop 
out of school.5 Moreover, rape victims are six times more likely to at-
tempt suicide than are victims of other crimes.6 Compounding the 
rapes and sexual assaults many young women suffer is the equally trou-
bling reality that many victims feel re-victimized by the responses of 
their schools.7 Yet schools also struggle with the appropriate response 
to student-on-student sexual harassment and assault.8 Administrators 
                                                                                                                      
 
2 Karjane et al., supra note 1, at 2 (indicating that in eighty to ninety percent of 
campus rapes and sexual assaults, the victim and the perpetrator know each other); Kath-
ryn M. Reardon, Acquaintance Rape at Private Colleges and Universities: Providing for Victims’ 
Educational and Civil Rights, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 395, 397 (2005). Additionally, six per-
cent of college men will experience attempted or completed sexual assault. Christopher 
P. Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual Assault (CSA) Study: Final Report 5–5 (2007) 
(unpublished report submitted to the National Institute of Justice), available at 
http://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf. 
3 Karjane et al., supra note 1, at ii. 
4 See Krebs et al., supra note 2, at viii; Rana Sampson, Acquaintance Rape of Col-
lege Students 8 (2002), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021472.pdf (de-
scribing victims of acquaintance rape as suffering similar psychological harms as victims of 
stranger rape, including “shock, humiliation, anxiety, depression, substance abuse, suicidal 
thoughts, loss of self-esteem, social isolation, anger, distrust of others, fear of AIDS, guilt, 
and sexual dysfunction”); Reardon, supra note 2, at 398. 
5 Sampson, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that college student victims may be likely to leave 
school for fear of encountering the perpetrator in shared classes, dining halls, or dormito-
ries); Reardon, supra note 2, at 399. 
6 Krebs et al., supra note 2, at viii. 
7 See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007); 
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 952, 955 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated 
en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000). Consider the experience of Lisa Simpson and Anne Gilmore. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 
1184. Simpson and Gilmore were both students at the University of Colorado-Boulder in 
December 2001 when, asleep in their shared bedroom following a party, they awoke to find 
themselves surrounded by a group of men, including members of the football team and high 
school recruits visiting campus. Id. at 1172, 1180. Ms. Simpson was raped both orally and 
vaginally by multiple assailants while Ms. Gilmore was assaulted by three other men in the 
same room at the same time. Id. at 1180. After Ms. Simpson reported the incident to the 
police, the university revoked the spring-semester scholarships of four football players who 
were allegedly involved, but did not deny the players’ eligibility to participate in the January 
2002 Fiesta Bowl. Id. And despite “overwhelming” evidence that a particular recruit partici-
pated in the gang rapes, the school’s football coach continued to support the recruit’s admis-
sion to the university. Id. 
8 See Wendy J. Murphy, Using Title IX’s “Prompt and Equitable” Hearing Requirements to 
Force Schools to Provide Fair Judicial Proceedings to Redress Sexual Assault on Campus, 40 New 
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seeking to implement policies and procedures that are fair to both ac-
cused and victimized students often face criticism from both sides.9 
 Congress and the U.S. Department of Education have sought to 
address the problem of sexual assault in the nation’s schools through 
legislation such as Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.10 
Most commonly known for promoting equality in sports participation, 
Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in any educational pro-
gram or activity that receives federal funds.11 Under Title IX, discrimi-
nation includes conduct which denies or limits a student’s ability to 
benefit from a school’s programs or activities on the basis of that stu-
                                                                                                                      
Eng. L. Rev. 1007, 1008, 1010 (2006) (describing student outrage when Harvard College 
announced a new policy requiring complaints of sexual assault to be accompanied by “suf-
ficient independent corroboration” before the school would undertake an investigation of 
the complaint); Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: 
A Roadmap for “Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 653, 653–54 
(2001) (describing a “firestorm” of controversy ignited by the Columbia University Sen-
ate’s effort to enact a new sexual misconduct policy furthering a “non-adversarial ap-
proach” to sexual assault disciplinary proceedings); Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Conse-
quences for Sexual Assault, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www. 
publicintegrity.org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault-0 (explaining that 
student victims of sexual assault often expect punishment from campus disciplinary pro-
ceedings whereas colleges often view discipline as an opportunity to educate, not to pun-
ish, accused students). 
9 See Tenerowicz, supra note 8, at 658–60 (describing pressure on college administra-
tors beginning in the early 1990s to establish disciplinary procedures that were more solici-
tous of victims of sexual assault and describing critics’ assertions that such policy shifts 
resulted in campus “Star Chambers”). 
10 See Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Office 
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Har-
assment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties i 
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 Guidance], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ 
ocr/docs/shguide.html; Elizabeth Jewell, ed., Athletics and Title IX of the 1972 Education 
Amendments, 11 Geo. J. Gender & L. 245, 246–47 (2010); see also Megan Ryan, ed., Com-
ments from the Spring 2007 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender Conference, 31 Harv. J.L. & 
Gender 378, 381 & n.14 (2008) (describing the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Secu-
rity Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, a statute that requires colleges and universities 
to compile and disclose annual campus crime statistics, as another congressional response 
to sexual violence on college campuses). 
11 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Title IX therefore applies to both public and private schools as 
a condition on their receipt of federal funding. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2011); 2001 Guid-
ance, supra note 10, at 2. Because Title IX also applies to schools that benefit from federal 
funding indirectly by virtue of their students’ receipt of federal financial aid, almost every 
college and university in the United States, public or private, must comply with Title IX. See 
Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 693 (3d Cir. 1982); Thomas N. Sweeney, Comment, 
Closing the Campus Gates—Keeping Criminals Away from the University—The Story of Student-
Athlete Violence and Avoiding Institutional Liability for the Good of All, 9 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 
226, 244 & n.99 (1999). 
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dent’s sex.12 Courts and the Department of Education recognize sexual 
harassment as conduct that is so severe or pervasive that it creates a 
hostile learning environment, thereby limiting a student’s ability to ac-
cess the full benefits of a school’s program.13 Even a single incident of 
sexual assault can create a hostile environment and constitute sexual 
harassment.14 Consequently, Title IX requires schools to respond 
“prompt[ly] and effective[ly]” to student-on-student sexual harassment 
and assault to mitigate the effects of the hostile learning environment 
and to safeguard all students’ right to an education free from sex-based 
discrimination and violence.15 
 In April 2011, Vice President Joseph Biden and U.S. Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan announced that the Department of Education 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), the agency charged with enforcing Title 
IX, was issuing a “Dear Colleague Letter” focusing on sexual assault on 
college campuses and schools’ Title IX obligations to respond.16 The 
Department of Education designated the Dear Colleague Letter a “sig-
nificant guidance document,” meaning that it sets forth statements of 
general policy and interpretive rules of broad, prospective applicability 
on regulatory and statutory issues.17 The Dear Colleague Letter does 
                                                                                                                      
12 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (2011); 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 4. 
13 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 2, 3, 5, 29 n.37 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999)). 
14 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 273 & n.12 (4th Cir. 2006) (acknowledg-
ing that a single incident of sexual assault or rape could be sufficient to raise the possibility 
of a hostile learning environment, but holding that a college soccer coach’s remarks and 
innuendo did not rise to that level), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 482 F.3d 686, 691 
(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that soccer coach’s persistent, sexually-charged comments were so 
severe and pervasive that, if proven, would constitute hostile learning environment sexual 
harassment); Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 259 & n.4 (6th Cir. 
2000) (observing that under Title IX a hostile environment could arise from a single inci-
dent); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter 3 (Apr. 
4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html. 
15 See 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 4, 12; Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived 
“Catch-22”: Providing Fairness to Both the Accused and Complaining Students in College Sexual 
Assault Disciplinary Proceedings, 38 J.L. & Educ. 277, 280 (2009). 
16 Press Release, The White House, Vice President Biden Announces New Administra-
tion Effort to Help Nation’s Schools Address Sexual Violence (Apr. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/04/vice-president-biden-announces-
new-administration-effort-help-nation-s-s; see Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 2. 
17 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 1 n.1; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Ex-
ec. Office of the President, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 3432, 3434, 3439 ( Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter OMB Bulletin]; see also William Funk, A 
Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1321, 1322--23 (2001) (describing agencies’ 
use of interpretive guidance documents, such as opinion letters, agency memoranda, and 
guidelines, to clarify agencies’ views of their enabling statutes for regulated entities). 
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not add substantive requirements to Title IX or its implementing regu-
lations; rather it clarifies OCR’s interpretation of Title IX and its ac-
companying regulations in the specific context of sexual violence in the 
college and university setting.18 
 One significant component of the Dear Colleague Letter is its 
specification of the standard of proof schools must use in campus disci-
plinary proceedings for sexual assault complaints.19 Prior to the Dear 
Colleague Letter, OCR had not specified that Title IX requires schools 
to use a particular standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings ad-
dressing student-on-student sexual assault.20 According to the Letter, 
however, for a school’s disciplinary procedures to comply with Title IX, 
the school must utilize the “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
in adjudications for sexual harassment and assault.21 Thus, a school’s 
use of a higher standard, such as “clear and convincing evidence,” 
would constitute a violation of Title IX.22 According to OCR, the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard is necessary to ensure an equita-
ble disciplinary proceeding because it is consistent with other civil 
rights laws and is the evidentiary standard used by OCR itself when in-
vestigating a school’s alleged failure to comply with Title IX.23 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 1 n.1; OMB Bulletin, supra note 17, 
at 3434, 3439. Although interpretive guidance documents such as the Dear Colleague Let-
ter have been the subject of some scrutiny in the context of an agency’s authority to issue 
such documents without formal notice and comment, this Note focuses on the constitu-
tional due process implications of the Dear Colleague Letter’s substantive policy state-
ments. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020, 1024, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
see also Thomas J. Fraser, Note, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of Deference Accorded Them 
Offer Insight into the Procedural Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1303, 1309 (2010) (describing the 
criticism that agencies’ informal policy statements circumvent notice-and-comment proce-
dures); infra notes 190–280 and accompanying text. 
19 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
20 See 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 20; Letter from Will Creeley, Dir. of Legal & 
Pub. Advocacy, Found. for Individual Rights in Educ. (FIRE), to Russlynn Ali, Assistant 
Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. 6 (May 5, 2011) [hereinafter 
FIRE Letter], available at http://thefire.org/public/pdfs/48934710c977d689391d03a1da8 
67dc7.pdf?direct. 
21 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
22 Id. Schools that fail to comply with Title IX may be subject to enforcement actions 
by OCR. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2006). Title IX authorizes the withdrawal of a school’s federal 
funds for failure to comply voluntarily with OCR. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
recognized an implied private right of action under Title IX that enables students to sue 
their schools for money damages or injunctive relief if the school fails to respond properly 
to incidents of sexual violence on campus. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648; Franklin v. Gwinnett 
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979). 
23 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 11. 
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 In response to the Dear Colleague Letter, critics have argued that 
the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in school disci-
plinary proceedings may jeopardize or even violate the due process 
rights of accused students.24 Commentators argue that because of the 
significant individual interests at stake for the accused student in a 
campus disciplinary proceeding that could result in suspension or ex-
pulsion, the higher clear and convincing evidence standard is required 
to guard against the risk of error in schools’ proceedings.25 
 This Note examines the constitutional due process rights of public 
college and university students and argues that the preponderance of 
the evidence standard is a sufficient minimum standard to ensure due 
process protections for accused students in campus disciplinary pro-
ceedings for sexual assault.26 Part I of this Note describes the due proc-
ess rights of students at public colleges and universities and presents 
the three-part balancing test that courts use to determine the specific 
procedures required when due process applies.27 Part II examines 
three evidentiary standards that federal courts have addressed in assess-
ing the procedures necessary to safeguard students’ due process rights 
in disciplinary proceedings: (1) substantial evidence, (2) preponder-
ance of the evidence, and (3) clear and convincing evidence.28 By ap-
plying the Supreme Court’s due process balancing test, Part III then 
demonstrates that the preponderance of the evidence standard, more 
so than the higher, clear and convincing evidence standard, strikes the 
appropriate due process balance between accused students and their 
schools in adjudications of student-on-student sexual assault com-
                                                                                                                      
24 See, e.g., FIRE Letter, supra note 20, at 10. Due process protections apply only to pub-
lic school students because public schools, but not private schools, are “state actors” under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Walter Saurack, Note, Protecting 
the Student: A Critique of the Procedural Protection Afforded to American and English Students in 
University Disciplinary Hearings, 21 J.C. & U.L. 785, 787 (1995). 
25 See Nicholas Trott Long, The Standard of Proof in Student Disciplinary Cases, 12 J.C. & 
U.L. 71, 80–81; FIRE Letter, supra note 20, at 10. 
26 See infra notes 31–96, 191–280 and accompanying text. Because due process protec-
tions under the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to public school students, this Note’s 
analysis of the standard of proof necessary to ensure procedural due process in discipli-
nary proceedings applies only to public, tax-supported institutions. See Saurack, supra note 
24, at 786–87; infra notes 191–280 and accompanying text. This Note remains relevant, 
however, for private institutions wishing to ensure that their disciplinary policies comport 
with due process values as they implement procedures required by Title IX. See Grove City 
Coll., 687 F.2d at 693; 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2011); Hogan, supra note 15, at 278 n.2 (observing 
that private institutions frequently choose to craft procedures that conform to due process 
requirements). 
27 See infra notes 31–96 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 97–190 and accompanying text. 
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plaints.29 This Note thus asserts that all schools bound to follow Title IX 
may rest assured that by complying with the Dear Colleague Letter and 
implementing the preponderance of the evidence standard, schools 
will continue to protect accused students’ due process rights.30 
I. The Due Process Rights of Accused Students and the 
 Thi lause of 
e 
                                                                                                                     
Obligations of Public Colleges and Universities 
s Part describes courts’ application of the Due Process C
th Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to public school 
students.31 Because public schools are considered state actors under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, due process is required in disciplinary pro-
ceedings if those proceedings threaten to deprive the student of an in-
terest that falls within the meaning of “life, liberty, or property.”32 Sec-
tion A of this Part explains courts’ rationales for holding that the Due 
Process Clause applies to public school students.33 Section B then be-
 
29 See infra notes 191–280 and accompanying text. 
lying with Title IX, schools 
will 
 See infra notes 32–96 and accompanying text. 
S. at 576; Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of 
Edu
 See infra notes 36–55 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 212–280 and accompanying text. By comp
also be protecting the rights of victimized students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); 34 
C.F.R. § 106.31(a)–(b) (2011); 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 12; Hogan, supra note 15, 
at 277. Generally, procedural due process requirements and Title IX’s statutory and regu-
latory requirements are complementary. See Hogan, supra note 15, at 277. The Fourteenth 
Amendment creates a right to due process prior to the state’s deprivation of an individ-
ual’s life, liberty, or property. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Title IX creates a statutory 
right to an education free from sex-based discrimination and violence. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 
34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a)–(b). Thus, under the U.S. Constitution, school disciplinary proceed-
ings must adhere to procedural requirements that ensure due process for the accused 
student, and under Title IX, school disciplinary proceedings must adhere to procedural 
requirements that ensure a school’s prompt and equitable response to complaints of sex-
ual assault to ensure an education free from discrimination for the victimized student. See 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a); Hogan, supra note 15, at 
277. 
31
32 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Goss, 419 U.
c., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961). When a state action threatens the recognized 
interests of an individual, the state must provide both substantive and procedural due pro-
cess. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles & Policies 557 (4th ed. 
2011). Substantive due process looks to whether the state had adequate justification for its 
decision to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property and whether the action was 
“arbitrary and capricious.” See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217 (1985); 
Chemerinsky, supra, at 558. Procedural due process refers to the procedures the govern-
ment must utilize before depriving an individual of a recognized interest. Chemerinsky, 
supra, at 557. The Supreme Court has treated the standard of proof as an element of pro-
cedural due process. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). This Part thus focuses on the procedural due process require-
ments for public school disciplinary proceedings. See infra notes 56–96 and accompanying 
text. 
33
1620 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1613 
gins by describing the three-part balancing test set forth by the Supreme 
Court for determining the procedural safeguards required to ensure 
due process.34 Section B continues by surveying the minimum proce-
dural due process protections currently required by federal courts for 
public school disciplinary proceedings, and Section B concludes by 
highlighting the overlap between Title IX’s procedural requirements 
and those of the Due Process Clause.35 
A. Liberty and Property: Applying the Due Process Clause of the  
 This Section se lding that the Due 
roc
perty interests need not be enumerated in 
e 
                                                      
Fourteenth Amendment to Students 
ts forth courts’ rationales for ho
P ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to public school 
students because of students’ property and liberty interests in their edu-
cation.36 Due process jurisprudence asks two basic questions: (1) Does 
due process apply?, and if so, (2) What process is due?37 To answer the 
first question, courts look to whether a state action threatens to deprive 
an individual of a “property,” “liberty,” or “life” interest within the mean-
ing of the Due Process Clause.38 If the state’s action threatens a recog-
nized interest, the state must afford due process before depriving the 
individual of that interest.39 
 Specific liberty and pro
th Constitution to demand due process protections.40 In 1972, in 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
both “property” and “liberty” may be broadly construed in determining 
whether the Due Process Clause applies to restrain a state’s action 
against an individual.41 The Roth Court defined a property interest as a 
“legitimate claim of entitlement” originating in “existing rules or un-
derstandings” created by sources other than the Constitution, such as 
state law.42 The Court defined a liberty interest as the freedom to “en-
joy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pur-
                                                                
34 See infra notes 56–69 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 70–96 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 37–55 and accompanying text. 
37 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
38 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972); Morrissey, 408 
U.S. at 481. 
39 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572–73. 
40 See id. at 572–73; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
41 408 U.S. at 572, 577. 
42 Id. at 577. 
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suit of happiness by free men,” such as the freedom to contract, to 
marry, or to pursue one’s chosen occupation.43 
                                                                                                                     
 In 1974, in Goss v. Lopez, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, primary and 
secondary school students have both a property and a liberty interest in 
their education.44 In Goss, nine public high school students sued the 
Columbus Public School System alleging that an Ohio state law permit-
ting a school principal to suspend a student for up to ten days without a 
hearing of any kind violated the students’ right to procedural due pro-
cess.45 The Court determined that the student plaintiffs had a property 
interest in their education because Ohio state law had created a “le-
gitimate claim of entitlement” to a public school education both by es-
tablishing a public school system and by requiring children to attend.46 
The Goss Court also concluded that public school students face the 
deprivation of a liberty interest in school disciplinary proceedings be-
cause disciplinary charges could damage students’ reputations among 
their peers and teachers and harm future educational or employment 
opportunities.47 Thus, under Goss, the Due Process Clause applies to 
public school students because disciplinary proceedings implicate both 
their property and liberty interests.48 
 
 
43 Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
44 419 U.S. at 576. The 1961 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education laid the foundation for the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Goss. Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 n.8; see Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158; Charles Alan Wright, The 
Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1031 (1969) (referring to Dixon as a 
“path-breaking” decision that caused due process law in the public school context to 
“turn[] 180 degrees”). In considering the due process rights of public university students, 
the Fifth Circuit in Dixon held that a student’s right to continued education at a public 
institution of higher learning at which that student is already enrolled is an interest that 
ought to be protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 294 F.2d 
at 157, 158. In Dixon, Alabama State College had summarily expelled nine black students, 
including the six plaintiffs, who had participated in a peaceful protest by entering a segre-
gated lunch counter located in the basement of the County Courthouse in Montgomery, 
Alabama. Id. at 152 & n.3, 154. The university president expelled each of the six plaintiffs 
by letter, affording them no opportunity for a hearing, and identifying the only grounds 
for expulsion as “this problem of Alabama State College.” Id. at 152, 154. In response, the 
Fifth Circuit deemed it unacceptable that a public university failed to afford students the 
same basic procedures enjoyed by “a pickpocket” in a court of law. Id. at 158 (quoting War-
ren A. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: “Due Process,” 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406, 1407 (1957)). 
45 419 U.S. at 568–69. 
46 Id. at 573--74. 
47 See id. at 574–75. In 1971, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the Supreme Court held that 
a person’s “good name, reputation, honor, [and] integrity” are liberty interests requiring 
protection under the Due Process Clause. 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). 
48 419 U.S. at 576. Generally, when the individual liberty interest at stake is reputa-
tional, the Supreme Court requires that a property interest also be in jeopardy for due 
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 Although the Supreme Court’s holding in Goss was limited to pri-
mary and secondary school students, lower federal courts have ex-
tended the Court’s reasoning to students of public colleges and univer-
sities.49 In so doing, some lower federal courts have emphasized the 
heightened significance of the property and liberty interests at issue for 
post-secondary school students.50 For example, in 1975, in Gaspar v. 
Bruton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that it had 
“no difficulty” extending Goss to recognize an adult nursing student’s 
property interest in her education.51 And the court observed that the 
plaintiff may have a stronger claim of entitlement to her continued ed-
ucation than the high school students in Goss because the plaintiff in 
Gaspar paid a fee to attend the state-run nursing program.52 Similarly, 
in Smyth v. Lubbers, also decided in 1975, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Michigan held that the Due Process Clause “plainly 
                                                                                                                      
process protections to apply. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 228, 233, 234 (1991) (holding 
that a supervisor’s negative recommendation of a former government employee did not 
constitute a deprivation of the plaintiff’s liberty interest because the reputational harm to 
the former employee was not accompanied by any other tangible deprivation, such as the 
termination of employment); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976) (holding that the 
Kentucky police’s publication of the plaintiff’s name and photograph on a flyer warning 
local businesses of “active shoplifters” may have harmed the plaintiff’s reputation, but did 
not constitute a deprivation within the meaning of the due process clause because the 
reputational harm was not accompanied by the deprivation of an entitlement extended by 
state law); see also Tigrett v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the Due Process Clause did not apply to two University of Virginia 
students who were subjected to disciplinary proceedings but not actually suspended or 
expelled because the proceedings, though potentially harmful to the students’ reputa-
tions, did not infringe on their property interests in a continued education). 
49 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576; Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(holding that it is “not questioned” that public post-secondary students have a constitu-
tionally-protected liberty and property interest in their education); Hart v. Ferris State 
Coll., 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1380, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding it “undisputed” that disci-
plinary sanctions, such as suspension or expulsion, implicate a post-secondary students’ 
liberty and property interests); Saurack, supra note 24, at 790–91. Since its decision in Goss, 
the Supreme Court has had another occasion to consider whether the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to public university students, but the Court de-
clined to reach this question, holding only that if the Due Process Clause applied to the 
university student plaintiff, the university’s actions would not constitute a violation of the 
student’s substantive due process rights. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215, 222–23 (addressing 
whether a university’s dismissal of a student for inadequate academic performance in a six-
year undergraduate-medical degree program could constitute a violation of the student’s 
due process rights). 
50 See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975); Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 
365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D. Me. 2005); Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 622 (D.P.R. 
1974). 
51 513 F.2d at 843, 850. 
52 Id. at 850. 
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applie[d]” to the two plaintiff-college students who were suspended 
following the discovery of marijuana in their dormitory rooms.53 The 
Smyth court emphasized that the students’ liberty interest in their good 
reputation was particularly strong where the charged disciplinary in-
fractions also met the definitions for state law crimes because a guilty 
verdict in the school disciplinary proceeding could pose a significant 
threat to the students’ future educational and career opportunities.54 
Since Goss, lower federal courts have routinely held that the Due Proc-
ess Clause applies to post-secondary school students when disciplinary 
proceedings implicate their property and liberty interests.55 
B. Due Process Applies, So What Process Is Due? 
 Once a court has determined that an individual’s liberty and 
property interests are implicated by a state action, the court must then 
determine the nature of the process the state must afford prior to de-
priving an individual of those interests.56 This Section first presents the 
three-part balancing test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 to 
determine the specific procedural safeguards required when a state 
action implicates an individual’s procedural due process rights.57 This 
Section then describes the due process procedures courts most com-
monly require of disciplinary proceedings at public colleges and uni-
versities.58 Finally, this Section concludes by describing the overlap be-
tween Title IX’s procedural requirements for disciplinary hearings and 
those of the Due Process Clause in the context of campus sexual as-
sault.59 
                                                                                                                      
53 398 F. Supp. 777, 781, 796 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
54 Id. at 796–97. The two students were charged with “disorderly conduct and posses-
sion of narcotic drugs in violation of both State of Michigan laws and/or Grand Valley 
State Colleges regulations.” Id. at 796. 
55 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12; Gaspar, 513 F.2d at 850; Siblerud v. Colo. State Bd. of Ag-
ric., 896 F. Supp. 1506, 1512–13 (D. Colo. 1995); Jaksa v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 597 
F. Supp. 1245, 1247–48 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of Nw. Mo. State 
Univ., 397 F. Supp. 822, 827 (W.D. Mo. 1975). Whereas all public school students have 
property and liberty interests in their education, the protections of the Due Process Clause 
likely only apply to students who are defending against disciplinary charges. See Theriault 
v. Univ. of S. Me., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5, 7–8 (D. Me. 2004) (finding that the Due Process 
Clause did not apply to a student-victim of sexual assault because the disciplinary proceed-
ings directed against the alleged perpetrator did not directly threaten to deprive the victim 
of a property interest in her education). 
56 Goss, 419 U.S. at 577; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. 
57 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); infra notes 60–69 and accompany-
ing text. 
58 See infra notes 70–85 and accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Due Process Balancing Test: How Courts Decide What Process 
Is Due 
 When a student accused of misconduct files suit against a school 
alleging that the school’s disciplinary proceedings violated the stu-
dent’s procedural due process rights, courts evaluate the school’s pro-
cedures under the Supreme Court’s due process balancing test.60 In 
1976, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the U.S. Supreme Court held that proce-
dural due process requires, at minimum, notice and the fair opportu-
nity to be heard; the Court further held that the sufficiency of the pro-
cedures utilized by a government actor, such as an administrative body, 
should be assessed under a three-part test.61 The test weighs (1) the 
individual private interest that will be affected by the state action, and 
(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that private interest, against (3) 
the public interests implicated, including the substantive social costs 
and the administrative burdens that would arise from the implementa-
tion of more procedure.62 The test originated in part from the Court’s 
view that due process is a flexible standard that does not mandate a uni-
form, technical procedure, but instead requires consideration of the 
competing interests at stake in a particular type of proceeding.63 The 
Court recognized that the formal procedural rules that evolved for ad-
judications in courts of law may not always be appropriate for adminis-
                                                                                                                      
60 See, e.g., Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1993); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14–
15. Since the Supreme Court first recognized students’ due process rights in Goss, two dis-
tinct trends have emerged in courts’ review of school disciplinary procedures. See Bd. of 
Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 87 (1978); Lisa L. Swem, Note, Due 
Process Rights in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. & U.L. 359, 361 (1987). In cases of un-
satisfactory academic performance, such as a student failing multiple courses in a graduate 
program, courts defer to schools’ procedures by reviewing academic decisions only to en-
sure they are not arbitrary or capricious and afford substantive due process. See Ewing, 474 
U.S. at 215–16, 222–23; Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 81–82, 91–92; Swem, supra, at 361–62. By con-
trast, courts will closely scrutinize schools’ policies and procedures in response to students’ 
non-academic misconduct, such as possession of drugs or violence against another stu-
dent. See, e.g., Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16–17; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 796–97. The increased 
risk of erroneous fact-finding in disciplinary proceedings justifies courts’ scrutiny of school 
disciplinary proceedings under the procedural due process rubric. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 
580. Disciplinary misconduct often call for procedures resembling administrative or judi-
cial hearings because facts of the misconduct must be adduced and competing versions of 
events evaluated; whereas in academic proceedings, school officials will have ready access 
to a student’s grades, test scores, and other performance evaluations necessary to make an 
informed and fair decision. See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158–59. 
61 424 U.S. at 335. In Mathews, the Court considered the proper procedures for the So-
cial Security Administration to use in its initial termination of an individual’s benefits. Id. 
at 348. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. at 334. 
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trative agencies and other government bodies and concluded that the 
procedures utilized by state and government actors should be tailored 
to the circumstances of the decision to be made and the private inter-
ests in jeopardy.64 
 Since Mathews, courts have routinely applied the three-part test in 
evaluating a broad range of procedures utilized by state agencies and 
other state actors, including public schools.65 When applying Mathews 
in the context of college and university disciplinary proceedings, courts 
have upheld Mathews’ general principles that due process is a flexible 
standard and that particular procedures should be evaluated in light of 
the interests of the student on one side and the school on the other.66 
Courts have also emphasized that school disciplinary proceedings need 
not mirror criminal trials or entail “full-dress” judicial proceedings.67 
Yet in light of the interests at stake for the individual students, includ-
ing their continued enrollment in school and the reputational costs of 
disciplinary sanctions, school disciplinary procedures must adequately 
protect students’ due process rights.68 Courts’ application of the 
Mathews balancing test thus seeks to ensure that schools utilize funda-
mentally fair procedures that afford students the opportunity to re-
spond to the charges against them without imposing highly technical 
or unwieldy procedures on schools.69 
                                                                                                                      
64 See id. at 348–49 (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter’s observation in FCC v. Pottsville 
Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940), that the differences between administrative agencies 
and the courts, in terms of their respective origins and purposes, caution against “whole-
sale transplantation” of procedural rules that have evolved in the specific context of courts 
of law). 
65See Osteen, 13 F.3d at 223, 226 (applying the Matthews test to a public university’s dis-
ciplinary proceedings to determine the extent of procedures required to satisfy the ac-
cused student’s due process rights); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 9, 14–15 (same); Gomes, 365 F. 
Supp. 2d at 15–17 (same); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758 (applying the Mathews test to 
determine the burden of proof necessary to satisfy due process in civil proceedings for the 
permanent termination of parental rights); Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 161, 163 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (applying the Mathews test to determine whether a state’s eighteen-month delay 
in providing a hearing for an appeal from a state board’s firearm license renewal decision 
could constitute a violation of procedural due process); Coleman v. Anne Arundel Cnty. 
Police Dep’t, 797 A.2d 770, 772, 774, 791 (Md. 2002) (applying the Mathews test to deter-
mine the burden of proof necessary to satisfy due process in a county police department’s 
disciplinary action against a police officer). 
66 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12, 14; Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
67 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14; Jaksa, 597 F. Supp. at 1249. 
68 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12, 14; Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
69 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 12, 14; Hart, 557 F. Supp. at 1387–88. 
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2. Procedural Requirements for School Disciplinary Proceedings 
 Currently, notice and the opportunity to be heard represent the 
basic requirements mandated by courts reviewing the procedural due 
process entitlements of college and university students in school disci-
plinary proceedings.70 In 1961, in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Educa-
tion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set forth the first 
suggestion of the specific procedural safeguards to which college and 
university students may be entitled prior to expulsion.71 The Dixon court 
indicated that due process would likely be satisfied by two basic proce-
dural safeguards: (1) notice to students of the specific charges against 
them and the grounds for those charges in the school’s disciplinary 
code, and (2) a hearing embodying a basic adversarial process.72 The 
Dixon court emphasized, though, that disciplinary proceedings need not 
be full-fledged adjudications with every procedural formality of a crimi-
nal trial; rather they must simply ensure the rudiments of a fair proce-
dure and adversarial process.73 
 Federal courts have generally upheld the Dixon court’s approach 
to balancing basic procedural safeguards against the school’s need for 
flexible, informal procedures.74 And some federal courts have ex-
tended Dixon to require four fundamental procedural safeguards.75 Ac-
cording to these courts, schools must (1) inform students of the 
charges against them, (2) advise students of the nature of the evidence 
supporting those charges, (3) afford students the opportunity to be 
heard in their own defense, and (4) sanction students based only on 
“substantial evidence.”76 Yet even among courts that have adopted 
these four procedural requirements, these courts have continued to 
emphasize that schools’ procedures may be tailored to the realities of 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13; Siblerud, 896 F. Supp. at 1516; Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 623. 
71 294 F.2d at 158–59. The Dixon court expressly held only that the Due Process Clause 
applies to public university students, but in dicta the court proffered some suggestions for 
specific procedures that may be necessary to safeguard students’ due process rights. Id. 
72 Id. at 158. 
73 Id. at 159. 
74 Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16; Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1970); Jaksa, 
597 F. Supp. at 1249. 
75 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16; Bistrick v. Univ. of S.C., 324 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D.S.C. 
1971); Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Me. 1970). The four-prong requirement 
appears to have originated in Charles Alan Wright’s 1969 article, The Constitution on Campus. 
Wright, supra note 44, at 1071–72 (describing “general agreement” that schools provide four 
procedural safeguards in any hearing that may lead to a serious penalty). 
76 Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16; Bistrick, 324 F. Supp. at 950; Keene, 316 F. Supp. at 221; 
Wright, supra note 44, at 1071–72. 
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schools’ limited resources and their need for flexibility in responding 
to various forms of misconduct.77 
                                                                                                                     
 Beyond the fundamental safeguards provided by notice of the 
charges and a full and fair opportunity to be heard, federal courts vary 
in their interpretation of the additional procedural safeguards required 
by the Due Process Clause in college and university hearings.78 For ex-
ample, some courts have held that due process requires that the ac-
cused student be allowed to secure representation by counsel either to 
serve as an advisor when criminal charges are also pending or in cases 
in which the university itself uses an attorney at the hearing.79 Other 
courts have found, however, that the right to counsel in a disciplinary 
hearing is not absolute because such a requirement could lead to the 
costly “judicializing” of school disciplinary proceedings.80 Additionally, 
some courts have recognized an accused student’s right to a list of the 
witnesses the university intends to call.81 Federal courts remain split, 
however, as to the accused student’s right to cross-examine witnesses.82 
Courts have also required disciplinary hearing boards to be impartial 
and free to exercise judgment independent of university officials.83 But 
courts do not always require that hearing committee members recuse 
themselves if they have prior familiarity with the accused student or the 
 
77 See, e.g., Furey v. Temple Univ., 730 F. Supp. 2d 380, 399 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Gomes, 365 
F. Supp. 2d at 16–17; Carey v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. #17, 754 F. Supp. 906, 918 (D. Me. 
1990). 
78 See Swem, supra note 60, at 375, 376–77 (describing federal courts’ splits as to (1) 
whether representation by legal counsel is required to satisfy due process in disciplinary 
proceedings, and (2) whether accused students should have the right to cross examine 
witnesses). 
79 See Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Black Coal. v. Portland 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1973). 
80 See Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225; Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 925–26 
(6th Cir. 1988); Jaksa, 597 F. Supp. at 1252. 
81 See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 159; Herman v. Univ. of S.C., 341 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.S.C. 1971), 
aff’d, 457 F.2d 902, 902 (4th Cir. 1972). Where the accuser is another student, rather than a 
university official, however, some courts have recognized that universities may maintain the 
anonymity of the accusing student in order to protect that student from reprisals. See Jaksa, 
597 F. Supp. at 1253; Dillon v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 468 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D. Ark. 
1978), aff’d, 594 F.2d 699, 700 (8th Cir. 1979); Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642, 666 (D. 
Neb. 1972). 
82 Compare Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a col-
lege student’s right to cross-examine witnesses was not an essential due process require-
ment), with Dillon, 468 F. Supp. at 58 (holding that due process “demanded” the opportu-
nity for cross-examination where witness testimony was essential to the committee’s find-
ings and the identity of the accusing school official was known to the student). 
83 See Winnick, 460 F.2d at 548 (observing that an impartial decisionmaker is a funda-
mental due process requirement); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(same). 
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conduct at issue.84 Despite these variations, two core principles of pro-
cedural due process emerge: (1) an accused student must be afforded 
notice and a hearing, and (2) college disciplinary proceedings need 
not be as formal as proceedings in a court of law.85 
3. The Intersection of Due Process and Title IX Procedural 
Requirements 
 In addition to the procedural requirements imposed on public 
school disciplinary proceedings under the Due Process Clause, Title IX, 
through its accompanying regulations and guidance documents, also 
sets forth procedural requirements that schools must follow in response 
to sexual assault on campus.86 By requiring schools to treat the victim-
ized and accused students equitably in disciplinary actions, Title IX 
helps to ensure that schools’ responses to sexual assault mitigate the ef-
fects of the hostile learning environment created by student-on-student 
sexual assault.87 Title IX’s procedural requirements are especially im-
                                                                                                                      
84 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15 (holding that prior contact between disciplinary board 
members and hearing participants in the university setting does not indicate bias “per se”); 
Hillman v. Elliott, 436 F. Supp. 812, 816 (W.D. Va. 1977) (finding that the sort of prejudice 
necessitating recusal requires more than knowledge of the events at issue). 
85 See Gorman, 837 F.2d at 13, 14; Jaksa, 597 F. Supp. at 1249, 1250; Ctr. for Participant 
Educ. v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126, 136 (N.D. Fla. 1972). 
86 See Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006); 34 
C.F.R. § 106.31(b) (2011); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 10–12; 2001 Guid-
ance, supra note 10, at 12, 20; see also supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text (discussing 
the procedural requirements imposed on public schools under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
87 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a)–(b); 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 12, 14, 20. For ex-
ample, under Title IX schools must provide both complaining and accused students with 
“similar and timely” access to materials and information that will be used by the parties at a 
disciplinary hearing. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 11. Similarly, if a school 
allows the accused student to appeal either a finding or a penalty, it must also allow the 
complaining student to appeal. Id. at 12. Finally, both the complaining and accused stu-
dents must be apprised of the outcome of any disciplinary proceeding, ideally at the same 
time. Id. at 13. 
Although the Family Education and Right to Privacy Act (FERPA) does not, under 
most circumstances, permit disclosure of information in a student’s educational records, 
such as disciplinary penalties, schools are permitted to disclose to a complaining student 
aspects of any penalties that directly relate to the complaining student (e.g., whether the 
perpetrator will be suspended from school for a period of time or made to switch dormito-
ries). See Family Education and Right to Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(5)--(6) (2006 
& Supp. IV 2010); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 11. Additionally, when a 
student’s conduct involves a crime of violence, including forcible or non-forcible sexual 
assault, a post-secondary institution may, under FERPA, disclose to the victim any violations 
found to have been committed and any sanction imposed on the perpetrating student. See 
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(5)--(6); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
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portant in safeguarding victimized students’ rights because the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment likely does not apply to 
student victims of sexual assault who are complaining witnesses in 
school disciplinary proceedings.88 Title IX thus ensures that disciplinary 
proceedings for complaints of student-on-student sexual assault afford 
procedural safeguards to complaining students that balance the safe-
guards provided to accused students under the Due Process Clause.89 
                                                                                                                     
 Accordingly, Title IX’s procedural requirements largely comple-
ment the due process requirements that protect the accused student.90 
For example, if a federal court has interpreted the Due Process Clause 
to require that a public university provide the accused student with a 
list of witnesses it intends to call, Title IX requires simply that the com-
plaining student be provided with the same list.91 Similarly, if a federal 
court interprets the Due Process Clause to require that an accused stu-
dent be permitted to retain legal counsel, whether for advice or to par-
ticipate in the proceeding, Title IX requires that the complaining stu-
dent be permitted to obtain the assistance of counsel for the same pur-
poses.92 Moreover, administrative guidance interpreting Title IX ex-
pressly requires that schools develop and implement procedures that 
protect the due process rights of accused students.93 
 Yet despite largely parallel protections, the procedural require-
ments of Title IX and the Due Process Clause occasionally appear to 
conflict—as is evident in the response to OCR’s recent clarification that 
Title IX requires schools to use the preponderance of the evidence 
standard in disciplinary proceedings for student-on-student sexual as-
sault.94 Whereas the Dear Colleague Letter indicates that the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard is a necessary component of schools’ 
 
88 See Theriault, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 7–8 (observing that the plaintiff had cited no case 
law, and the court had found none, in which the student seeking due process protections 
was the complaining student, not the defending student, in a school disciplinary proceed-
ing); supra note 55. 
89 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a)–(b); 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 12, 20; supra note 
30. 
90 See Hogan, supra note 15, at 277–78. 
91 See, e.g., Dixon, 294 F.2d at 159; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 11. 
92 See, e.g., Black Coal., 484 F.2d at 1045; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 12. 
93 2001 Guidance, supra note 10, at 22. 
94 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 10–11; FIRE Letter, supra note 20, at 
10–11. Potential conflicts between the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Title IX are of great concern to public schools because they are obligated by law to 
comply with both. See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 (requiring public schools to afford due 
process protections to students in disciplinary proceedings); 2001 Guidance, supra note 
10, at 2, 22 (describing the Title IX obligation of any school receiving federal funds to 
respond adequately to sexual harassment and assault). 
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equitable response to sexual assault on campus, commentators assert 
that the preponderance of the evidence standard is too low to safeguard 
accused students’ due process rights.95 This apparent conflict is recon-
cilable, however, because, as the remainder of this Note demonstrates, 
among the standards of proof available for school disciplinary proceed-
ings, the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately safeguards 
accused students’ liberty and property interests in their education while 
accommodating the equally weighty interests of their schools.96 
II. Competing Evidentiary Standards in College and University 
Disciplinary Proceedings 
 Federal courts have examined three possible standards of proof in 
student lawsuits alleging due process violations in school disciplinary 
proceedings.97 Unlike other procedural safeguards, such as representa-
tion by counsel, the standard of proof in school disciplinary proceed-
ings has garnered relatively little attention.98 This Part examines the 
various evidentiary standards that federal courts have considered in 
reviewing school disciplinary proceedings.99 Section A describes the 
theoretical and practical significance of assigning a particular standard 
of proof to a particular class of cases.100 Section B presents the standard 
of proof known as “substantial evidence,” which has been upheld by 
many of the federal courts that have addressed the standard of proof 
necessary for school disciplinary hearings.101 Finally, Section C de-
scribes two alternative standards of proof explored by federal courts in 
the context of school disciplinary proceedings: “preponderance of the 
evidence,” upheld by a minority of courts, and “clear and convincing 
evidence,” suggested, but not yet required, by any federal court.102 
                                                                                                                      
95 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 10–11; FIRE Letter, supra note 20, at 
10–11. 
96 See infra notes 97–280 and accompanying text. 
97 See Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1119 (E.D. Wis. 2001) 
(observing that the standard of proof in public school disciplinary proceedings could be no 
lower than preponderance of the evidence); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 799 (W.D. 
Mich. 1975) (suggesting that the clear and convincing standard of proof may be most appro-
priate for college and university disciplinary proceedings); Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 
613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974) (finding that procedural due process required university disciplinary 
proceedings to be based on “substantial evidence”). 
98 See Long, supra note 25, at 73. 
99 See infra notes 103–190 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 103–122 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 123–148 and accompanying text. 
102 See infra notes 149–190 and accompanying text. 
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A. Why Standards of Proof Matter: The Theoretical and Practical  
Significance of Selecting a Standard of Proof 
 The standard of proof applied in a given proceeding is important 
for theoretical and practical reasons.103 On the theoretical side, the 
standard of proof imposed in a particular class of cases reflects the val-
ue society places on the rights that are in jeopardy.104 This is because 
standards of proof signal to the fact-finder the level of certainty society 
requires before the state may act to impair an individual’s rights.105 Ad-
ditionally, articulating a specific standard of proof for a particular type 
of hearing, no matter the particular standard selected, helps to ensure 
the meaningfulness of the hearing’s other procedural safeguards.106 
Whereas many procedures focus on whether and how evidence is pre-
sented to the fact-finder (e.g., by prescribing whether counsel may 
speak for a party, whether cross-examination will be allowed, or wheth-
er written statements will be admitted), the standard of proof is one of 
the few procedures informing the fact-finder’s response to the evidence 
itself.107 The standard of proof tells the fact-finder that findings must be 
made within the confines of the persuasive force of the evidence pre-
sented.108 If the fact-finder is not told to what degree the evidence must 
influence the finding of the facts, he or she may ultimately be per-
suaded by tangential prejudices or policy concerns, regardless of the 
weight of the evidence presented.109 Thus the fact-finder must be told 
how to weigh the evidence in order to ensure the meaningfulness of a 
hearing’s other evidentiary procedures.110 
 The standard of proof is also significant for its practical implica-
tions regarding the risk of error.111 The consistent application of a par-
ticular standard notifies each party in advance of the risk of error and 
how each party will share the burden of that risk.112 Additionally, stan-
dards of proof are thought to allocate the risk of erroneous findings of 
fact according to the “comparative social disutility” of different types of 
                                                                                                                      
103 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
104 Id. at 425. 
105 Id. at 423 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
106 See Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 797. 
107 See id. 
108 See id.; Louis L. Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 Harv. 
L. Rev. 914, 915 (1966). 
109 Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 797. 
110 See id. 
111 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427. 
112 See id. at 423. 
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erroneous outcomes.113 The application of a particular standard of 
proof to a class of cases will influence the likelihood of erroneous fac-
tual conclusions in one of two directions.114 Higher standards of proof 
produce fewer erroneous conclusions that result in a false finding of 
guilt yet comparatively more erroneous conclusions in which a guilty 
person goes free.115 Society accepts this result in cases in which a false 
finding of guilt would result in a particularly egregious deprivation of 
individual rights, such as in criminal trials.116 Hence, the highest evi-
dentiary standard, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” is reserved for crimi-
nal proceedings.117 Lower evidentiary standards, such as the common 
civil standard of preponderance of the evidence, are applied in cases in 
which the relative harm to society of an erroneous finding is approxi-
mately equal no matter whether the error favors the plaintiff or the de-
fendant.118 For example, in a civil suit for money damages, if the fact-
finder erroneously finds in favor of the defendant, society is left with 
one party, the plaintiff, suffering an uncompensated harm.119 If, by 
contrast, the fact-finder erroneously finds in favor of the plaintiff, soci-
ety is still left with one party, now the defendant, wrongfully required to 
pay a judgment the defendant does not owe.120 Accordingly, the harm 
to society in the event of error is essentially equal, so the standard of 
proof requires only that the finding be “more likely than not.”121 Thus, 
the selection of a particular standard of proof is “more than an empty 
semantic exercise” as the standard of proof guards against erroneous 
outcomes in proportion to the harm faced not simply by each party, but 
also by society at large.122 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 371, 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
114 See id. at 370. 
115 See id. at 370–71. 
116 See id. at 372. One may be reminded here of English jurist William Blackstone’s fa-
mous adage: It is “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” See 
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1997). 
117 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428; Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
118 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 371–72 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th 
Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see Winship, 397 U.S. at 
371--72 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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B. The Prevailing Standard: Substantial Evidence 
 In determining the evidentiary standard necessary to satisfy due 
process in school disciplinary proceedings, courts have considered 
three standards of proof: substantial evidence, preponderance of the 
evidence, and clear and convincing evidence.123 This Section describes 
the substantial evidence standard and presents criticism stating that 
substantial evidence is inappropriate to ensure procedural due process 
in school disciplinary proceedings.124 Section C then presents both the 
preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence 
standards as two alternative standards of proof addressed by federal 
courts in the context of due process protections in school disciplinary 
proceedings.125 
 Although few courts have directly addressed the constitutionally-
required evidentiary standard for school disciplinary proceedings, of 
those courts, the majority have held that due process requires discipli-
nary decisions to be based on “substantial evidence.”126 Substantial evi-
dence is defined as enough relevant evidence that a reasonable person 
would support the fact-finder’s conclusion.127 And the substantiality of 
the evidence must be based on the record as a whole; that is, the fact-
finder’s conclusion must be based on evidence that is substantial in 
light of the evidence in the record that both bolsters and detracts from 
that conclusion.128 
                                                                                                                      
123 See Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799; Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 
623. No court has required a school to use the beyond a reasonable doubt standard be-
cause the Supreme Court has reserved that standard almost exclusively for criminal trials. 
See Addington, 441 U.S. at 419–20, 428 (describing application of the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard in criminal cases as a central component of the “moral force of the crimi-
nal law” and holding that in the case of involuntary commitment in a mental institution 
for an indefinite period of time, the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence 
was sufficient to satisfy due process (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364)); Swem, supra note 
60, at 380 (explaining that courts do not require schools to employ the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard even when the misconduct at issue meets the definition of a state law 
crime). 
124 See infra notes 126–148 and accompanying text. 
125 See infra notes 149–190 and accompanying text. 
126 See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir. 1975); Gomes v. 
Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15–16 (D. Me. 2005); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 
209 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Swem, supra note 60, at 379 (describing the substantial evidence 
standard as “the norm” among federal courts ruling on school disciplinary proceedings). 
127 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). 
128 Id. at 487–88. 
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 As early as the 1960s, federal district courts applied the substantial 
evidence requirement to school disciplinary proceedings.129 Since 
then, one federal court of appeals has upheld the substantial evidence 
standard as the appropriate minimum standard to ensure procedural 
due process protections in school disciplinary proceedings.130 In 1975, 
in Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held that the university’s disciplinary proceedings 
met the constitutional requirements of due process in part because the 
disciplinary committee’s findings were based on substantial evi-
dence.131 The Slaughter court reasoned that the disciplinary commit-
tee’s procedures satisfied due process because its findings were based 
on substantial evidence and the fact-finding procedures were adequate 
as a whole.132 Since Slaughter, courts have continued to uphold the sub-
stantial evidence standard as sufficient to safeguard public university 
students’ due process rights.133 
                                                                                                                     
 Courts and commentators have criticized the substantial evidence 
standard, however, as insufficient to satisfy due process for at least three 
reasons.134 First, some courts have criticized substantial evidence as too 
low to ensure procedural due process.135 In 1975, in Smyth v. Lubbers, 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that in 
a university disciplinary proceeding in which an adult student was 
charged by a college for conduct that also constituted a crime, due 
process required that the college formally adopt a standard of proof.136 
The Smyth court did not reach the question of the required standard of 
proof, but it did state in dicta its certainty that the standard could not 
 
129 See, e.g., Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 623; Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161, 169, 
171 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 290 F. Supp. 622, 631 (W.D. Mo. 
1968). 
130 Slaughter, 514 F.2d at 625. Two other federal appeals courts have also upheld the 
substantial evidence standard, but as a requirement for substantive, rather than proce-
dural, due process. See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 643 (6th Cir. 2005); Nash 
v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 667–68 (11th Cir. 1987). 
131 514 F.2d at 625. Although the plaintiff’s claim in Slaughter was based in contract 
theory, as Brigham Young University is a private institution, the court nevertheless exam-
ined the procedures utilized by the university through the lens of procedural due process 
as applied to public universities. Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16; Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of Nw. Mo. State Univ., 
397 F. Supp. 822, 831 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Gagne v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 692 N.E.2d 489, 493 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
134 See Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799; Jaffe, supra note 108, 
at 915; Long, supra note 25, at 79. 
135 See Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799. 
136 398 F. Supp. at 797. 
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be lower than preponderance of the evidence.137 The Smyth court criti-
cized the substantial evidence standard as unfair to the defendant be-
cause the standard requires only some reasonable quantity of evidence 
to support the fact-finder’s conclusion.138 Therefore, the standard pro-
vides no guidance for the fact-finder as to the relative quantity of evi-
dence necessary to resolve conflicting interpretations of the evidence in 
the record.139 Such a result, according to the Smyth court, leaves the 
fact-finder “adrift” to be persuaded by individual prejudices rather than 
by the weight of the evidence presented.140 
 Second, one commentator has suggested that courts’ rulings re-
garding substantial evidence may have been misconstrued as requiring 
substantial evidence to serve as the standard of proof in school discipli-
nary proceedings.141 Rather, courts may simply have intended their re-
quirement of findings based on substantial evidence to ensure substan-
tive due process by serving as “an admonishment against arbitrari-
ness.”142 Indeed, some courts have found that a disciplinary proceeding 
satisfies due process only when the school follows the dictates of proce-
dural due process and the decision is based on substantial evidence.143 
Courts’ treatment of procedural due process and substantial evidence 
as separate requirements thus supports the inference that the substan-
tial evidence requirement does not impose a specific standard of proof 
as a procedural requirement but simply seeks to ensure that schools’ 
disciplinary decisions satisfy the substantive due process requirement 
that decisions be justified by the evidence presented.144 
                                                                                                                      
137 Id. at 799. Whereas substantial evidence requires only that the conclusion of the 
fact-finder be based on enough evidence to be objectively reasonable in light of the record 
as a whole, preponderance of the evidence requires that the evidence support a conclu-
sion that is more likely than not. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 371–72 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(defining preponderance of the evidence); Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477 (defining 
substantial evidence). 
138 See 398 F. Supp. at 798. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 797. 
141 See Long, supra note 25, at 79. 
142 See id. Substantive due process guards against state decisions that are “arbitrary” or 
“capricious” by requiring that state actors have adequate justification for decisions that 
deprive an individual of a protected interest. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 
U.S. 214, 217 (1985); Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 558. 
143 See Slaughter, 514 F.2d at 625; Hartman v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 436 So. 2d 837, 
840 (Ala. 1983). 
144 See Slaughter, 514 F.2d at 625; Hartman, 436 So. 2d at 840; Long, supra note 25, at 79. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally treated standards of proof as elements of proce-
dure. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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 Finally, some critics have opined that substantial evidence may in 
fact be a standard of review, not a standard of proof.145 The substantial 
evidence test evolved in administrative law jurisprudence as the standard 
courts apply when reviewing the fairness of an administrative tribunal’s 
original decision on appeal.146 Therefore, the substantial evidence stan-
dard may merely set forth the quantity of evidence a reviewing court 
must find to uphold the fact-finder’s decision, rather than the degree of 
persuasion by which the original fact-finder must be convinced that a 
fact is true.147 Yet despite these criticisms, courts continue to uphold 
substantial evidence as one of the fundamental procedural due process 
requirements for school disciplinary proceedings—perhaps to ensure 
schools’ flexibility in establishing disciplinary procedures tailored to the 
needs of their communities.148 
C. Two Alternative Standards: Preponderance of the Evidence  
and Clear and Convincing Evidence 
 Not all federal courts agree that the substantial evidence standard 
adequately safeguards students’ due process rights.149 Indeed, some 
have concluded that preponderance of the evidence, or the even high-
er standard of clear and convincing evidence, may be required.150 
1. Preponderance of the Evidence 
 At least two federal courts have found that due process requires 
schools to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard in school 
disciplinary proceedings.151 The preponderance of the evidence stan-
                                                                                                                      
145 See Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 798; Jaffe, supra note 108, at 915. 
146 See McDonald v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 375 F. Supp. 95, 103 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
147 See Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 798 (describing the substantial evidence standard as suffi-
cient to assess whether there was a “minimal rational basis” for the tribunal’s finding but 
not sufficient to establish the measure of persuasion necessary for the original fact-finder); 
Jaffe, supra note 108, at 915 (describing the appropriate role of the fact-finder as actually 
believing a fact to be true, not merely objectively weighing the probability of the truth of a 
contested fact). 
148 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16; Edwards, 397 F. Supp. at 831 (acknowledging the 
doubts of other federal courts as to the applicability of the substantial evidence test but 
nevertheless applying the standard); Gagne, 692 N.E.2d at 493; Swem, supra note 60, at 
379–80. 
149 See Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799 (recommending that schools use the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard, especially in cases in which an adult student is charged with 
misconduct that is also a crime, but holding that due process would not permit a standard 
lower than preponderance of the evidence). 
150 Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799. 
151 Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799. 
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dard is commonly used in civil actions between private parties for 
money damages.152 It requires that the evidence presented to the fact-
finder render the truth of a contested fact more likely than not.153 
Courts requiring a preponderance of the evidence standard in school 
disciplinary proceedings have discarded the substantial evidence stan-
dard because it is too low of a standard of proof to protect students’ due 
process rights.154 For example, in 2001, in Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin 
School District, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin held that the decision of a high school “Coaches’ Council” to sus-
pend a player from athletics participation violated the student’s due 
process rights because the Council’s decision was based on insufficient 
evidence.155 The court held that, in the first instance, the Council must 
apply a standard no lower than preponderance of the evidence.156 Ac-
cording to the court, because the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard requires the fact-finder to find facts to be true to the degree of 
more likely than not, any lower standard could yield the illogical result 
of allowing a fact-finder to find a fact to be “true” even if less likely than 
not.157 Similarly, in 1975, in Smyth, the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Michigan stated that the appropriate standard of proof 
could not be any lower than preponderance of the evidence because a 
lower standard, such as substantial evidence, would essentially shift the 
burden to accused students to prove their innocence.158 Such a shift, 
according to the court, would be “fundamentally unfair” to the accused, 
rendering the substantial evidence standard insufficient to ensure due 
process.159 Thus courts have required schools to utilize the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard primarily to ensure that schools do not 
                                                                                                                      
152 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. 
153 Winship, 397 U.S. at 371–72 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining the preponderance 
of the evidence standard). 
154 See Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799. 
155 See 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, 1121. The Butler court assumed without holding that 
suspension from participation in high school sports constituted a deprivation of a property 
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
id. at 1110–11. Although the plaintiff in Butler was a high school student, the court’s ruling 
is instructive for college disciplinary proceedings because, as in the case of college stu-
dents punished by their school for perpetration of sexual assault, Butler was suspended for 
conduct that would have constituted a crime under state law. See id. at 1108 (listing Butler’s 
offenses as “unlawful possession of intoxicants . . . and . . . fireworks”). 
156 Id. at 1119--21. 
157 Id. 
158 See 398 F. Supp. at 799. 
159 See id. 
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sanction students based on facts found to be anything less than prob-
able.160 
 Additionally, many colleges and universities have voluntarily 
adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard for use in their 
disciplinary proceedings.161 Scholars supporting schools’ use of pre-
ponderance of the evidence have asserted that the standard is the most 
appropriate for school disciplinary proceedings because it accommo-
dates the interests of the accused student, the victimized student, and 
the campus community.162 Preponderance of the evidence acknowl-
edges the gravity of the interests at stake for the accused student 
through application of a standard commonly applied in courts of 
law.163 But the preponderance of the evidence standard also enables 
schools to ensure that the interests of the victimized student and the 
school community are properly weighed against the interests of the ac-
cu d.se
                                 
164 
 Although widely accepted as a standard of proof in civil law, pre-
ponderance of the evidence has faced challenges in certain civil con-
texts on the ground that it is not adequate as a procedural safeguard 
when particularly significant liberty interests are at stake.165 For exam-
ple, in 1979, in Addington v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the preponderance of the evidence standard was insufficient to satisfy 
due process in cases in which a state sought to commit an individual to 
                                                                                     
most common standard used by colleges and 
uni
162 See Anderson, supra note 161, at 1015–16; Stoner & Lowery, supra note 161, at 48–
49. 
cused student, the victim-
ized
5 See Stoner & Lowery, supra note 161, at 48; infra notes 166--172 and accompanying 
text
160 See Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799. 
161 See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration 
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 945, 1000 
& n.331 (2004) (citing a study by the National Institute of Justice reporting that of the 
colleges and universities that had articulated a standard of proof for disciplinary proceed-
ings, eighty percent had chosen preponderance of the evidence); Edward N. Stoner II & 
John Wesley Lowery, Navigating Past the “Spirit of Insubordination”: A Twenty-First Century 
Model Student Conduct Code with a Model Hearing Script, 31 J.C. & U.L. 1, 48 n.146 (2004) 
(referencing a study by the Association for Student Judicial Affairs finding that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard is the 
versities in sexual assault adjudications). 
163 See Stoner & Lowery, supra note 161, at 48. 
164 See Anderson, supra note 161, at 1016 (advocating for schools’ use of the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard to ensure that victimized students are free to lodge com-
plaints of sexual assault even if the only evidence they have is their account of the assault); 
Stoner & Lowery, supra note 161, at 48–49 (encouraging schools to use the preponderance 
of the evidence standard because it treats the interests of the ac
 student, and the entire student body as equally important). 
16
. 
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a mental institution for an indefinite period of time.166 In Addington, 
the Court determined that the individual interest at stake, the loss of 
physical liberty for an indefinite period, was so significant that prepon-
derance of the evidence should not apply because it asked the individ-
ual to “share equally with society the risk of error.”167 Therefore, due 
process required the use of the higher clear and convincing evidence 
standard to guard against the risk of error and to signal to the fact-
finder the significance of the individual interests in jeopardy.168 Simi-
larly in 1982, in Santosky v. Kramer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the Due Process Clause required the New York State Family Court to 
utilize the clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings for 
the permanent termination of parental rights.169 The Court empha-
sized the particularly unique liberty interest at stake for parents facing 
the irrevocable deprivation of their right to parent their natural chil-
dren.170 In such cases, the Court concluded, the preponderance of the 
evidence standard is insufficient because the risk of harm in the event 
of error is much greater for the individual than for the state.171 Thus, 
the preponderance of the evidence standard has been deemed consti-
tutionally insufficient in certain classes of cases, but it remains the most 
common standard of proof applied to civil claims.172 
. C
                                                                                                                     
2 lear and Convincing Evidence 
 In the context of school disciplinary proceedings, some courts and 
commentators have proposed that the higher clear and convincing 
standard may be required to safeguard students’ constitutional rights.173 
The clear and convincing standard falls between preponderance of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt in the certainty it requires of 
 
25, 431. 
. 
747–48. 
at the state could bring another charge as soon as it amassed new evidence. 
See i
nderance of the evidence standard as “normal in impor-
tant
19; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799; Long, supra note 25, at 
80; 
166 Addington, 441 U.S. at 4
167 See id. at 425–26, 427. 
168 See id. at 427, 431–32
169 455 U.S. at 
170 Id. at 759. 
171 See id. The Court emphasized that preponderance of the evidence was insufficient 
because of the lack of double jeopardy protections in parental rights proceedings, which 
meant that an error in favor of the state would result in the permanent termination of the 
parental rights of an otherwise fit parent, whereas an error favoring the unfit parent would 
simply mean th
d. at 764. 
172 See id. at 768; Addington, 441 U.S. at 423, 431; see also Stoner & Lowery, supra note 
161, at 48 (describing the prepo
 civil judicial proceedings”). 
173 See Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 11
FIRE Letter, supra note 20, at 10. 
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the fact-finder.174 Courts apply the clear and convincing standard to civil 
actions in which the individual interest at stake is deemed extremely 
important, including cases of involuntary civil commitment, permanent 
rm
                                                                                                                     
te ination of parental rights, or denaturalization.175 
 Because accused students face the deprivation of a property inter-
est in their continued education as well as the reputational harm that a 
disciplinary penalty could rend on their educational and career goals, 
commentators and one federal court have suggested that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard may be necessary to ensure adequate 
protection of the accused student’s right to procedural due process.176 
In 1975, in Smyth, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan suggested, but did not hold, that the clear and convincing 
evidence standard may be required in disciplinary proceedings in 
which an adult student is charged with misconduct that would consti-
tute a crime under state law.177 In support of the clear and convincing 
evidence standard, the court cited the serious consequences of a guilty 
finding by the college, including the potentially negative impact on the 
student’s future educational and employment prospects as well as the 
student’s reputation.178 In a “highly competitive society,” the court ob-
served, an individual’s educational and career advancement could be 
seriously hindered by a disciplinary finding of misconduct such as the 
possession of narcotics alleged in Smyth.179 Such a finding is much more 
significant, the court observed, than “spiking the punch at an after-
school meeting.”180 Consequently, the higher standard of clear and 
convincing evidence may be necessary to guard against the risk of error 
when a school disciplinary proceeding seeks to deprive a post-
 
Addington, 441 U.S. at 431–32; Schneider-
man
 
revo
nts charged with serious infractions, the 
clea
y a majority of application forms that the plaintiff disclose 
any . Id. 
7. 
174 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24. 
175 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48, 756–57; 
 v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943). 
176 See Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 797, 799; Long, supra note 25, at 80 (asserting that the 
clear and convincing evidence standard is most appropriate because it weighs in favor of 
the accused student and acknowledges that “‘rights once conferred should not be lightly
ked’” (quoting Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125)); FIRE Letter, supra note 20, at 7. 
177 See 398 F. Supp. at 799 (stating that the standard of proof for school disciplinary 
proceedings could be no lower than preponderance of the evidence and suggesting that in 
disciplinary proceedings for post-secondary stude
r and convincing standard may be required). 
178 See id. at 797. The Smyth court specifically discussed the plaintiff’s attempts to apply 
to law school and the request b
 disciplinary record
179 Id. at 796–9
180 Id. at 797. 
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secondary student of significant interests in reputation and career ad-
vancement.181 
 Despite proposals that schools utilize the clear and convincing 
standard in disciplinary proceedings, no court has found clear and 
convincing evidence necessary to protect students’ due process 
rights.182 Such restraint may be explained by courts’ consistent cautions 
that school disciplinary proceedings need not be as formal as judicial 
proceedings in a court of law, as well as courts’ efforts to avoid impos-
ing rigid or highly-technical procedures on public schools.183 Courts 
have long afforded schools the flexibility to tailor disciplinary proceed-
ings to meet the needs of their particular school communities.184 
Moreover, courts recognize that, like any other procedural safeguard, 
the appropriate standard of proof to satisfy due process should be as-
sessed through an application of the Mathews balancing test, which 
                                                                                                                     
weighs the interests of the accused student against those of the 
school.185 
 Thus, at least three possible standards of proof remain available 
for courts’ consideration when called upon to determine the minimum 
standard of proof required to satisfy accused students’ due process 
rights.186 Among the federal courts that have addressed the necessary 
evidentiary standard for university disciplinary proceedings, substantial 
evidence remains the most commonly upheld.187 At least two federal 
courts, however, have found that procedural due process requires a 
standard no lower than preponderance of the evidence, and many pub-
lic colleges and universities have chosen to adopt the preponderance of 
the evidence standard in their disciplinary policies.188 One federal 
court has also suggested that schools must use the even higher standard 
 
181 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 424; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 797, 799. 
182 See Swem, supra note 60, at 379–80. 
183 See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988); Dixon v. Ala. State 
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961). 
184 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14; Dixon, 294 F.2d 
at 159. 
185 See Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; see also Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 226 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (applying Mathews to determine whether the accused student was entitled to the 
right of participation of counsel in a disciplinary hearing); Gorman, 837 F.2d at 14–15 (ap-
plying Mathews to determine whether a student was entitled to “full-scale adversarial pro-
ceedings”). 
186 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
187 See Swem, supra note 60, at 379 (describing the substantial evidence standard as “the 
norm” among federal courts); supra note 133 and accompanying text (collecting cases). 
188 Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799; Anderson, supra note 161, 
at 1000; Stoner & Lowery, supra note 161, at 48 n.146. 
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of clear and convincing evidence to safeguard accused students’ due 
process rights, and some commentators agree that clear and convincing 
evidence may be necessary to accommodate the significant liberty and 
property interests at stake for accused students.189 Although the stan-
dard of proof necessary to ensure due process for accused students in 
college and university disciplinary proceedings has drawn little scrutiny 
f -
league Le
niversity students accused of misconduct may challenge the 
p
dence standard to the lower preponderance of the evidence standard 
tha
rom scholars or the courts, the Office for Civil Rights’ recent Dear Col
tter may well bring this issue to the fore.190 
III. Preponderance of the Evidence Is the Fairest Standard of 
Proof for University Disciplinary Proceedings 
 This Part argues that preponderance of the evidence is the most 
appropriate standard of proof for university adjudications of sexual as-
sault complaints because it adequately safeguards accused students’ due 
process rights while accommodating the significant competing con-
cerns of their schools.191 According to OCR’s interpretation of Title IX 
and its accompanying regulations, schools that receive federal funds 
must utilize the preponderance of the evidence standard in disciplinary 
proceedings arising from sexual assault complaints in order to comply 
with Title IX’s “prompt[] and equitabl[e]” response requirement.192 
Public-u
im lementation of the preponderance of the evidence standard as not 
sufficient to protect their due process rights in disciplinary proceed-
ings.193 
 As a practical matter, schools may be more likely to face constitu-
tional challenges for moving from the higher clear and convincing evi-
n for moving from the lower substantial evidence standard to the 
                                                                                                                      
189 See Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 799; Long, supra note 25, at 80; FIRE Letter, supra note 20, 
at 7. 
190 See Long, supra note 25, at 73. For example, only one month after the release of the 
Dear Colleague Letter, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), a non-
profit organization dedicated to defending the civil liberties and freedom of speech of 
students and faculty on college campuses, issued an open letter to OCR’s Assistant Secre-
tary the Dear Colleague Letter would 
cau rights” of accused students. See 
FIR ast visited Aug. 
28, 
 for Civil Rights voicing its “deep concerns” that 
se institutions to “curtail the procedural due process 
E Letter, supra note 20, at 1; FIRE, http://thefire.org/about/mission (l
2012). 
191 See infra notes 212–280 and accompanying text. 
192 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
193 See, e.g., Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 795 (W.D. Mich. 1975). 
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higher preponderance of the evidence standard.194 Students accused of 
misconduct will prefer a higher standard of proof because higher stan-
dards of proof place a greater evidentiary burden on the party bringing 
the charges and reduce the possibility of an erroneous finding against 
the accused student.195 Additionally, complaining students, who may 
prefer a lower standard of proof, cannot raise due process claims against 
their school.196 Due process protects only the accused student because 
in a disciplinary proceeding only the accused student faces the state’s 
irec
                                                                                                                     
d t deprivation of liberty and property interests in education.197 
 Consequently, this Part briefly addresses the benefits of prepon-
derance of the evidence as compared to the lower substantial evidence 
standard, but it focuses on whether the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is sufficient to protect accused students’ due process rights or 
whether the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence is re-
quired.198 Section A of this Part asserts that the use of the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, rather than the lower substantial evi-
dence standard, will benefit schools, accused students, and perhaps all 
students, by lending greater legitimacy and uniformity to school disci-
plinary proceedings.199 Section B then argues that the preponderance 
of the evidence standard is adequate to safeguard the procedural due 
process rights of accused students as compared to the higher clear and 
convincing evidence standard.200 By applying the due process balanc-
ing test first set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, Section B demonstrates that the preponderance of the evi-
 
194 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining 
that higher standards of proof reduce the risk of erroneous convictions, whereas lower 
standards of proof allocate the risk of error equally between the parties). Although it is 
ear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, 
at 1
cipli-
nar , not the defending party). 
. 
also possible that students who had been previously sanctioned by a disciplinary committee 
using the substantial evidence standard could assert claims seeking a new hearing under 
the higher preponderance of the evidence standard, the scope of this Note is limited to an 
analysis of the preponderance of the evidence standard in light of OCR’s clarification that 
Title IX requires schools to use preponderance of the evidence, and not clear and convinc-
ing evidence, in sexual assault adjudications. See D
1; infra notes 212–280 and accompanying text. 
195 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
196 See Theriault v. Univ. of S. Me., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D. Me. 2004) (finding that vic-
timized students may not assert due process claims against their schools regarding dis
y proceedings in which they are a complaining witness
197 See id.; supra notes 55, 88 and accompanying text
198 See infra notes 202–280 and accompanying text. 
199 See infra notes 202–211 and accompanying text. 
200 See infra notes 212–280 and accompanying text. 
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dence standard best accommodates the competing interests of accused 
 and their schools.201 students
ceedings 
ill 
     
A. The Benefits of Raising the Bar: Preponderance of the Evidence Promotes the 
Legitimacy and Uniformity of School Disciplinary Proceedings 
 The Dear Colleague Letter’s requirement that schools apply the 
preponderance of the evidence standard will lend legitimacy and uni-
formity to school disciplinary proceedings, benefitting both students 
and their schools.202 First, schools’ use of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard will afford students the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in a process that takes seriously the interests at stake for 
both parties.203 The application of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard will thereby enhance the legitimacy of school disciplinary 
proceedings in the eyes of students.204 The enhanced legitimacy of the 
proceedings will in turn serve to promote basic democratic values 
among the student body.205 Many post-secondary institutions see school 
disciplinary policies and procedures as influential in shaping students’ 
values.206 And as the Fifth Circuit observed in 1961, a disciplinary pro-
cedure that fails to adhere to fundamental principles of fairness and 
justice could “break the spirits” of accused students and other students 
familiar with the unjust process.207 Thus, if students have faith in the 
integrity of their school’s disciplinary proceedings, those pro
w serve as a positive example of the larger societal values the school 
seeks to uphold—that accused individuals are innocent until proven 
guilty, and that, if guilty, they will be sanctioned accordingly.208 
                                                                                                                 
201 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); infra notes 212–280 and accompanying text. 
andard that correctly treats accused students, complaining stu-
den
rack, supra note 24, at 785–86 (noting that disciplinary proceedings with ad-
equ
—guilty or innocent—taught, if the process producing the outcome was unjust? 
Tha supra note 24, at 
785
202 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 11; Long, supra note 25, at 81; Sau-
rack, supra note 24, at 786. 
203 See Stoner & Lowery, supra note 161, at 48–49 (describing the preponderance of the 
evidence standard as the st
ts, and the campus community at large as having equally important interests at stake in 
disciplinary proceedings). 
204 See Sau
ate procedural safeguards promote students’ sense that “justice has been done”). 
205 See id. 
206 See Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the 
University Student, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 289, 353 (1999) (“But what lessons are ‘convicted 
students’
t might makes right? . . . That fair ends justify foul means?”); Saurack, 
–86. 
207 Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961). 
208 See Saurack, supra note 24, at 785–86. 
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 Second, the uniform use of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard will benefit accused students by standardizing an important 
procedural protection among public and private schools.209 Whereas 
only state actors, and therefore only public schools, must ensure consti-
tutional due process in their disciplinary proceedings, all schools re-
ceiving federal funds, both public and private, must comply with Title 
IX.210 Therefore, as schools implement the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, as required by the Dear Colleague Letter, all students, 
no mat same 
standard if accused of p t.211 
 more properly allocates the 
risk of error between the accused student and the school, and better 
 stan-
da nd convincing evidence.215 
ter the type of school they attend, will be afforded the 
erpetrating sexual assaul
B. Preponderance of the Evidence Meets the Mark: Applying the  
Mathews Balancing Test 
 This Section applies the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to col-
lege and university disciplinary proceedings and demonstrates that the 
preponderance of the evidence standard provides sufficient due proc-
ess protection to accused students.212 The Supreme Court has stated 
that in determining whether a particular standard of proof satisfies due 
process in a particular class of cases, the Court does not favor any one 
standard over another but simply applies the three-part due process 
balancing test it first set forth in Mathews.213 Accordingly, this Section 
argues that a balancing of the three Mathews factors in the specific con-
text of campus sexual assault demonstrates that preponderance of the 
evidence is a sufficient minimum due process standard.214 Preponder-
ance of the evidence adequately accommodates the significant private 
interests at stake for the accused student,
accounts for the school’s countervailing interests than the higher
rd of clear a
                                                                                                                      
209 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) (noting that applying a uniform 
ndition on the receipt 
of fe
106.4. 
1. 
55 U.S. at 754; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (setting forth the three-
part
6–280 and accompanying text. 
evidentiary standard within a class of cases promotes fundamental fairness); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 106.4 (2011) (requiring all schools to comply with Title IX as a co
deral funding); Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 11. 
210 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); 34 C.F.R. § 
211 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 14, at 1
212 See infra notes 213–280 and accompanying text. 
213 See Santosky, 4
 balancing test). 
214 See infra notes 216–280 and accompanying text. 
215 See infra notes 21
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1. Mathews Factor One: Accused Students’ Interests in Continued 
Education 
 The first Mathews factor looks to the individual or “private” inter-
ests that will be affected by the state action at issue.216 In the case of 
school disciplinary proceedings for sexual assault, the Mathews balance 
considers only the individual interests of the accused student217—even 
though significant individual interests may also be at stake for a victim-
ized student who is the complaining witness in the disciplinary pro-
ceeding.218 The Mathews analysis does not seek to balance the interests 
of the accused against the interests of the victim because only the ac-
usec d student is subject to direct state action in the disciplinary pro-
ceeding.219 Accordingly, a proper conception of the first Mathews factor 
in analyzing school disciplinary proceedings focuses on the accused 
student’s property and liberty interests in continued enrollment in a 
university program.220 
 In disciplinary proceedings for sexual assault complaints, the private 
inter sts at stake for an accused student are indeed significant.221 A stu-
                                                                                                           
e
dent’s reputation, career goals, educational advancement, and relation-
ships with faculty and peers may all be affected by disciplinary proceed-
           
nalysis under 
the 
e interests of the child could not be considered. See 455 U.S. at 759. The Court 
ack
but ocedures, the focus 
mu
216 424 U.S. at 335. 
217 See Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1993) (limiting the Mathews 
analysis under the first prong to the private interests of the accused student in a discipli-
nary proceeding regarding a physical altercation with two other students); Gomes v. Univ. 
of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 10, 16 (D. Me. 2005) (limiting the Mathews a
first prong to the private interests of two students accused of sexually assaulting a 
peer). 
218 See Sampson, supra note 4, at 8 (acknowledging that if an accused perpetrator is not 
sanctioned, a victimized student may decide to transfer or drop out of school for fear of 
encountering the perpetrator on campus). Reputational harm could also accrue to a vic-
tim who is seen as lodging a false accusation against a peer. See Reardon, supra note 2, at 
396 (noting frequent skepticism toward students’ sexual assault complaints). 
219 See Theriault, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 8. In an analogous context, in 1982 the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Santosky v. Kramer explained that in assessing the due process rights of 
parents in parental rights termination proceedings arising from accusations of persistent 
neglect, th
nowledged that the child was certainly “deeply interested” in a “normal family home” 
 ruled that in an assessment of the adequacy of the fact-finding pr
st “emphatically” be on the parents because the state and the parents, not the child and 
the parents, are directly adverse in the proceeding. Id. at 759–60; see supra notes 55, 88. 
Additionally, the victimized student does not likely possess a constitutional right to due 
process in the proceeding against the alleged perpetrator, so the Mathews test will not ap-
ply. See id. 
220 See, e.g., Osteen, 13 F.3d at 226; Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988). 
221 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16; Saurack, supra note 24, at 785. 
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ings that could result in sanctions, such as suspension or expulsion.222 
Such significant private interests would appear to demand a concomi-
tantly high standard of proof in any state action seeking to infringe upon 
those interests.223 Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that the 
clear and convincing evidence standard is intended for those circum-
stances in which particularly important rights are at stake, beyond the 
mere financial loss associated with the typical civil lawsuit.224 College stu-
dents confronting disciplinary action may indeed face more than mere 
nanfi cial loss because their reputation may also be harmed.225 
 Yet the Supreme Court has typically reserved the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard for cases in which fundamental liberty inter-
ests are foreclosed.226 For example, the Court has described the inter-
ests at stake for parents facing permanent termination of their parental 
rights as a “unique kind of deprivation” in which the state seeks per-
manent termination of an interest “far more precious than property”— 
a parent’s legal relationship to his or her natural children.227 Likewise, 
involuntary civil commitment for an indefinite period constitutes a 
perhaps permanent deprivation of an individual’s physical liberty.228 
College and university students in disciplinary proceedings have a lib-
erty interest in their reputation and the freedom a good reputation af-
fords in pursuing further educational and career goals.229 As compared 
to permanent civil commitment or the irrevocable termination of one’s 
parental rights, the reputational interest is not quite so fundamental.230 
                                                                                                                      
222 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (acknowledging that disciplinary penalties for cam-
pus sexual assault could have a “major immediate and life-long impact on [the students’] 
personal life, education, employment, and public engagement”); Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 797 
y actually do. See Lombardi, 
supr ained by the U.S. Department 
of J
lege ad expelled only ten to 
twen
arlan, J., concurring). 
8; Addington, v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). 
797. 
20, 628 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that a disciplinary 
 
(describing the power of disciplinary sanctions to “shatter career goals”). Specific penalties 
for a finding of sexual assault vary from school to school. See Anderson, supra note 161, at 
988 (describing the broad range of sanctions usually available under college and university 
disciplinary codes, including “fines, reprimands, negative notations on one’s record, pro-
bation, suspension, or expulsion”). Although acts of sexual assault can lead to expulsion 
under school disciplinary codes, it is disputed how often the
a note 8 (describing an examination of a database maint
ustice, Office of Violence Against Women tracking sexual assault proceedings at col-
s and universities across the country and finding that colleges h
ty-five percent of students found guilty of sexual assault). 
223 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (H
224 See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–4
225 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 
226 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48; Addington, 441 U.S. 427. 
227 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59. 
228 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26. 
229 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576; Smyth, 398 F. Supp. at 797. 
230 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59; Addington, 441 U.S. 425–26; cf. Tigrett v. Rectors & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 6
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state’s deprivation of an 
individual’s interest in reputation alone is not sufficient even to require 
due process protections unless a property interest is also in jeopardy.231 
Public school students are entitled to due process protections because 
both liberty and property interests are implicated in school disciplinary 
proceedings.232 If, under the due process framework, the property in-
terest is actually the more significant interest at risk of deprivation for 
public school students, the preponderance of the evidence standard 
may be sufficient to safeguard that interest.233 Furthermore, even if the 
individual student interests are afforded significant weight, approach-
ing the interests of the natural parents in Santosky or the individual fac-
ing involuntary civil commitment in Addington, the other two Mathews 
cing 
evi
or accordingly considers the risk that an erroneous 
pr
factors weigh against the application of the higher clear and convin
dence standard.234 
2. Mathews Factor Two: The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of the 
Student’s Interests 
 The second consideration in the Mathews balance is the risk of er-
roneous deprivation of a student’s private interest in continued educa-
tion.235 In Mathews, the Court described the second factor as an inquiry 
into the “fairness and reliability” of the existing procedures, and the 
“probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.”236 The 
second Mathews fact
de ivation of the individual’s private interest will result from the use of 
a particular procedure and whether an alternative procedure would 
reduce that risk.237 
 Certainly, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the accused stu-
dent’s private interests should be minimized.238 In the context of cam-
                                                                                                                      
proceeding’s potential reputational harm to students, without an accompanying depriva-
tion of a property interest, did not warrant due process protections). 
); see also Tigrett, 290 F.3d at 628. 
233; Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (describing the preponder-
anc
.S. at 424; supra notes 226–229 and 
acco  notes 235–280 and accompanying text. 
a note 24, at 785. 
231 See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1991); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 
(1976
232 See Goss, 419 U.S. 576; Tigrett, 290 F.3d at 628; supra notes 36–55 and accompanying 
text. 
233 See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 
e of the evidence standard as most often applied in civil suits in which losses are reme-
diable with money damages). 
234 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48; Addington, 441 U
mpanying text; infra
235 424 U.S. at 335; see Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
236 424 U.S. at 343. 
237 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. 
238 See Saurack, supr
2012] Preponderance of the Evidence and Student-on-Student Sexual Assault 1649 
pus sexual assault, however, the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard does not present an impermissibly high risk of the erroneous 
sanctioning of innocent students because of the limited evidence typi-
cally available in sexual assault adjudications.239 Sexual assaults on col-
lege campuses are most often committed by someone the victim knows 
and are often perpetrated in private, in the context of a date or other 
social setting, so the existence of corroborating eyewitness accounts is 
unlikely.240 Additionally, perpetrators of acquaintance- or date-rape will 
often rely on alcohol or other drugs, rather than physical force or a 
weapon, to subdue the victim, so obvious physical injuries to the victim 
are not common.241 Furthermore, an individual’s typical emotional re-
actions to sexual assault—including shame, shock, and fear of retalia-
tion, may prevent timely reporting of the assault or collection of physi-
cal evidence of sexual contact.242 And in cases in which the primary 
issue is consent, evidence of sexual contact will not even be determina-
tive.243 Most college sexual assault adjudications thus center on a disci-
plinary committee’s assessment of the relative credibility of the com-
plaining and accused student.244 One commentator has also opined 
that college disciplinary committees are often so attuned to the inter-
ests at stake for the accused student that many committees may unwit-
ting
 stated standard of proof.245 Thus, in most college sex-
                                
ly require clear and convincing evidence to justify a finding of fault, 
regardless of the
                                                                                      
61 (describing evidentiary limitations in campus 
sexual assault cases). 
ous recommendation that any woman complainant alleging a crime of 
 
239 See Tenerowicz, supra note 8, at 6
240 See Karjane et al., supra note 1, at 2; Reardon, supra note 2, at 396; Tenerowicz, 
supra note 8, at 661. 
241 Reardon, supra note 2, at 397–98; Tenerowicz, supra note 8, at 661. 
242 See Sampson, supra note 4, at 8; Reardon, supra note 2, at 398. 
243 Tenerowicz, supra note 8, at 661. 
244 See id. 
245 Long, supra note 25, at 81. Such over-identification with the interest of the accused 
student may be especially likely in cases in which the committee doubts that a sexual as-
sault has actually occurred, such as when consent, not the identity of the perpetrator, is the 
primary issue. See Reardon, supra note 2, at 396. In such situations, concerns for the inter-
ests of the accused student will not be off-set by concerns for the interests of the victimized 
student because the complaining witness will not be seen as a victim of sexual assault at all. 
See id. Another scholar has expressed concern that historical biases encouraging skepticism 
of sexual assault complaints may cause disciplinary committees to impose a higher stan-
dard of proof for sexual assault proceedings than other types of cases. See Anderson, supra 
note 161, at 1015–16. Such bias concerns are premised on the law’s long tradition of 
doubting the claims of female victims of sexual assault. See, e.g., 3 John Henry Wigmore, A 
Treatise of the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
§ 924a (3d ed. 1940), excerpted in George Fisher, Evidence 311 (2d ed. 2008) (quoting 
the American Bar Association Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence’s 
1937–1938 unanim
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ual assault adjudications, the risk is not that the accused student will be 
found responsible based on too little evidence.246 Rather, because disci-
plinary committees expect more physical or testimonial evidence than 
could ever likely be produced in a case of acquaintance- or date-based 
sexual assault, a higher evidentiary standard is more likely to result in 
o f
r by properly 
loc
to ew guilty students being held accountable.247 
 Furthermore, when the risk of error of a particular procedure is 
analyzed under the second Mathews prong, additional analysis is re-
quired when the procedure at issue is the standard of proof itself.248 
Further inquiry is required because inherent in a standard of proof is 
the acknowledgement that some risk of error always exists in a tribu-
nal’s fact-finding process.249 Consequently, a standard of proof will be 
deemed to “reduce” the risk of error under the second Mathews prong 
if the risk of error is properly allocated between the two parties.250 
Thus, in the case of school disciplinary proceedings, one must ask 
whether the particular standard of proof at issue, here preponderance 
of the evidence, adequately guards against the risk of erro
al ating that risk between the student and the school.251 
 In the context of disciplinary proceedings for a charge of sexual 
assault, an error can occur in either direction, with grave consequences 
for either the individual or the institution.252 On one hand, an errone-
ous conclusion by the disciplinary board could result in sanctioning an 
innocent student for the perpetration of a sexual assault.253 Such sanc-
tions could impair a student’s property interest in continuing educa-
tion, and the stigma that could stem from a finding of guilt would likely 
harm the student’s emotional well-being and reputation in the com-
                                                                                                                      
sexual assault be examined by an experienced psychiatrist in order to ensure the woman 
did not suffer from “a mental or moral delusion”); Anderson, supra note 161, at 948–49 
(describing the Model Penal Code’s cautionary instruction for juries in sexual assault cases 
as codifying seventeenth century English jurist Matthew Hale’s view that rape is an accusa-
tion  “malicious and 
fals
ed sexual assault out of con-
cern xist 
in s
inship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
tosky, 455 U.S. at 761; Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 requiring special caution in trials because it is sometimes brought by
e witnesses”). 
246 See Reardon, supra note 2, at 396; Tenerowicz, supra note 8, at 661. 
247 See Long, supra note 25, at 81; Tenerowicz, supra note 8, at 661. Similarly, prosecu-
tors are often reluctant to pursue cases of acquaintance-bas
 that the jury will expect more evidence of injury or a struggle than would likely e
uch a case. See Anderson, supra note 161, at 989 & n.263. 
248 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761; W
249 See San
250 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761. 
251 See id. 
252 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 370–71 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
253 See id. 
2012] Preponderance of the Evidence and Student-on-Student Sexual Assault 1651 
munity.254 On the other hand, an error in the opposite direction could 
allow a student who had in fact sexually assaulted a peer to remain in 
the campus community unpunished.255 Such a result could harm the 
school and its educational mission by exposing other students to the 
risk of harm by a perpetrator who is not deterred from committing fu-
ture acts of sexual assault and by allowing a hostile environment to per-
sist for the victim.256 Because the interests at stake are significant for 
us 
fin eponderance of the evidence standard is most 
     
both the accused student and the school in the event of an erroneo
ding of fact, the pr
appropriate under the second Mathews factor because it allocates the 
risk of error equally between the accused student and the school.257 
3. Mathews Factor Three: Schools’ Interest in Responding to Sexual 
Assault on Campus 
 The third Mathews factor looks to the “public interests” that would 
be affected by requiring alternative or additional procedures in a par-
ticular state action.258 Public interests under the third Mathews prong 
include both substantive and administrative costs.259 In a due process 
                                                                                                                 
254 See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 16; Saurack, supra note 24, at 785. 
255 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring); Sampson, supra note 4, at 8. 
256 See Sampson, supra note 4, at 8 (noting the likelihood that student victims will leave 
school out of fear of encountering the perpetrator on campus in shared classes, dining 
halls, or dormitories); David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending 
Among Undetected Rapists, 17 Violence & Victims 73, 73, 80 (2002) (assessing a sample of 
men
ty person to go unpunished); supra notes 111–122 and accompanying text 
(des r a higher risk of false findings favoring guilty persons in 
crim
sub-
stan rens patriae” interest 
 
 who had never been involved with the criminal justice system whose self-reported acts 
met legal definitions of rape and finding that two-thirds of the men had perpetrated mul-
tiple rapes and more than half had perpetrated other acts of interpersonal violence). 
257 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. If a higher standard of proof were used, such as clear 
and convincing evidence, the likelihood of erroneous findings in favor of guilty students 
would be greater than the likelihood of erroneous findings wrongfully punishing innocent 
students. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 370–71 (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus the school would 
face a higher risk of harm from erroneous conclusions in disciplinary proceedings. See id. 
In light of the value society places on ensuring safe and effective learning environments 
for all students, such asymmetrical risk of harm to the school would not likely be tolerable. 
See, e.g., Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); cf. Win-
ship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing society’s willingness to accept an 
asymmetrical risk of error in the criminal context because the harm of punishing an inno-
cent person with criminal sanctions is seen as much greater than the harm to society of 
allowing a guil
cribing society’s toleration fo
inal trials because of the fear of depriving otherwise innocent persons of their per-
sonal liberty). 
258 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347. 
259See id. at 348. For example, in Santosky, the Supreme Court identified the state’s 
tive interest in parental rights termination proceedings as the “pa
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analysis of school disciplinary proceedings, courts interpret the third 
Mathews factor as accounting for the interests at stake for the school in 
departing from existing procedures.260 Substantively, schools have an 
interest in promoting their educational mission by embodying funda-
en
tion because the standard allocates the risk of error equally between 
m tal democratic values in their disciplinary proceedings and ensur-
ing a safe learning environment for all students.261 Administratively, 
schools have an interest in preserving their limited resources through 
disciplinary proceedings that are not highly formalistic or difficult to 
implement.262 
 A school’s interest in promoting and protecting its educational 
mission weighs heavily against the use of the clear and convincing stan-
dard.263 Schools have a substantive interest in utilizing disciplinary pro-
cedures that promote fundamental fairness and teach students that 
misconduct will result in proportional sanctions.264 If a school sanctions 
a disproportionate number of innocent students, the student body’s 
faith that the school’s procedures are fair will diminish and the educa-
tional value of the school’s procedures will be extinguished.265 Con-
versely, if the disciplinary procedures permit a disproportionate num-
ber of perpetrators of sexual assault to remain on campus unsanc-
tioned, the school’s failure to punish guilty students will send a message 
to the campus community that acts of sexual assault are not taken seri-
ously.266 The preponderance of the evidence standard thus best ac-
commodates a school’s concern for erroneous findings in either direc-
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the parties.267 Furthermore, schools have a substantive interest in pro-
moting a learning environment free from discrimination and vio-
lence.268 A school that fails to sanction students for acts of sexual assault 
faces the risk that those students who are not punished will commit fur-
ther acts of violence on campus.269 Such a result could endanger other 
students and perpetuate a discriminatory and hostile learning envi-
ronment.270 Thus, by guarding against not only those erroneous out-
comes that wrongfully punish innocent students, but also those that 
exonerate guilty students, the preponderance of the evidence standard 
accommodates schools’ substantive interest in promoting a safe and 
non-discriminatory learning environment.271 
 Additionally, the clear and convincing evidence standard could im-
pose costly administrative burdens on colleges and universities by pro-
moting increasingly formalistic campus disciplinary proceedings.272 In 
one sense, when a hearing procedure is already in place, the imposition 
of a new standard of proof would not seem to impose a significant addi-
tional burden on a tribunal.273 Courts have consistently emphasized, 
however, that schools should not be required to provide a “full-dress ju-
dicial hearing” or to administer highly technical proceedings whose 
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costs outweigh their benefits.274 A clear and convincing evidence re-
quirement could burden a school’s limited investigatory and adjudica-
tory resources by requiring a school to present evidence of significant 
quantity and quality in order to meet its burden.275 Schools may then 
feel obligated to employ counsel to marshal and present the necessary 
evidence to the disciplinary committee.276 A heightened standard of 
proof could also open a university to challenges to other evidentiary 
procedures utilized by the disciplinary committee.277 Given that most 
disciplinary committees are made up of lay fact-finders who must serve 
as both judge and jury in a given proceeding, courts are extremely re-
luctant to require schools to utilize formal rules of evidence.278 Indeed, 
the implementation of such complex rules could overwhelm the already 
limited resources of most public colleges and universities.279 Thus, un-
der the third Mathews prong as well, the preponderance of the evidence 
standard better accommodat bstantive and administrative 
ter
es schools’ su
in ests in the context of student-on-student sexual assault adjudica-
tions than would the higher standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence.280 
Conclusion 
 The pervasiveness of sexual assault on college campuses across the 
United States is of significant concern for university officials and stu-
dents alike. Title IX seeks to ameliorate this problem by requiring both 
public and private colleges to respond promptly and equitably to stu-
dent-on-student sexual assault. The Department of Education Office 
for Civil Rights recently clarified that Title IX requires all colleges to 
apply the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in discipli-
nary hearings for sexual assault complaints in order to safeguard vic-
timized students’ right to an education free from sex-based discrimina-
tion and violence. This clarification raises the question whether public 
colleges may comply with this requirement while also accommodating 
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 standard 
also best allocates the risk of error between the accu
school in light of the limited evidence commonly a
sexual assault cases. Thus, by complying with Title IX and implement-
ing the preponderance of the evidence standard, colleges and universi-
ties will adequately safeguard the rights of both accused and victimized 
students in the difficult context of sexual assault on campus. 
Lavinia M. Weizel 
accused students’ right to procedural due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. By applying the Mathews v. 
Eldridge due process balancing test, this Note demonstrates that the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, more so than the higher 
clear and convincing evidence standard, best accommodates proce-
dural due process in public school adjudications of sexual assault com-
plaints. The preponderance of the evidence standard properly balances 
the accused student’s interests in reputation and continued education 
with the school’s equally weighty concerns for promoting just proceed-
ings and a safe learning environment along with preserving scarce ad-
ministrative resources. The preponderance of the evidence
sed student and the 
vailable in campus 
